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Commentary /Geary: Sexual selection and mathematics
approximates with the sun a simple two-body system. Imagine
instead that the air was as viscous as water and full of currents, or
that the planets were more numerous and subject to electromag-
netic forces comparable to the force of gravity. In such worlds,
Galileo s and Newton's approximately pure cases do not occur, and
their work becomes more difficult by orders of magnitude. Gearys
work is, by his own account, at least as hard as theirs would be, for
there are at least four different sorts of forces bearing upon
mathematical abilities according to the boxes in his Figure 1, and
through their combined noise he manfully strains to discern the
effect of one of them: "Proximate Biological Influences (e.g., sex
hormones)."
Figure 1 makes the task look easier than it is, for all the arrows
flow out of the box at the top left: "Sexual Selection," which is
simply to diagram the unproven assumption that ultimately the
source of "Sex Differences in Mathematical Problem Solving and
Geometry" (box top right) must, like all biological phenomena,
find their source in evolution. Unfortunately, there are other
arrows that Figure 1 leaves out, such as, for example, the ones that
must go into the box "Sex Differences in Social Preferences and
Social Styles." Many things affect preferences and styles, and thus
bear on this set of sex differences, and not only nice scientific
things like whether the culture is agrarian or industrial, but also
quirky things, like Marilyn Monroe and Albert Einstein. Marilyn
was not much of a mathematician, though Einstein was, and no
doubt this has had some effect on some people s "social prefer-
ences and social styles," and thus, according to Geary, on sex
differences in mathematical abilities. In other words, the system in
Figure 1 is massively openl
In such a system, where angels fear to tread, we can only admire
Geary's speed in staking out the differential effect of XX relative to
XY chromosomes. What merits our special attention is his method.
What we really need here is something like lead balls falling
through calm air. Luckily, we have them, in the form of newborn
boys and girls. Unluckily, at that point the sexes manifest equally
only the most basic of arithmetical skills, "numerosity." Worse yet,
the skills in question appear only much later in life, after Marilyn,
Einstein, and whatever other cultural influences.
Which brings us to the first methodological stratagem Geary
proposes: to hear the sexual signal through the cultural noise, we
need only attend to evidence that is "pancultural," so that varying
cultural influences can cancel each other out. The methodological
inference is of this form: pancultural, hence noncultural, therefore
biological in origin. For instance, if men are taller than women
panculturally, then the difference is noncultural, therefore biolog-
ical in origin. But this form of inference is not generally reliable.
Funerary practices are found everywhere (even where there is no
mathematics) but surely there is no gene directing them. Like-
wise, news of Marilyn and Einstein pervades the mathematically
educated world, but that hardly makes their effects noncultural or
biological.
Mathematics itself is a cultural phenomenon. Homo sapiens
might well have prospered indefinitely without it: unlike the
heart, it is biologically unnecessary. Future paleoanthropologists
will note that the fossil remains of mathematics texts and calculat-
ing machinery appear in the same strata with remains of sophisti-
cated tools, buildings, musical instruments, automobiles, and
Marilyn Monroe movies. The cultural changes accompanying the
invention of mathematics occurred over most of the globe within a
few millennia of each other: People turned to agriculture, built
cities, and became more scientific, monotheistic, and monoga-
mous. Given that mathematics is itself a rich cultural phenomenon
lavishly embedded in yet other cultural phenomena, the purely
biological effects of sex upon it cannot be isolated by Geary's
simple panculturality stratagem.
A second dubious element of Geary's method is used whenever
he identifies sex differences on social dimensions relevant to
mathematical achievement. At these points he claims that "at least
a portion of the sex differences on these social dimensions is
biologically primary" (sect. 3.1, para. 8). This is a plausible assump-
tion, but it haplessly renders Geary's conclusion unfakifiable:
devoid of empirical content. We begin with the idea that the sex
differences in mathematics have either social or sexual causes, but
if we then assume that the social causes are themselves, at least in
part, the effects of sexual causes, then it is trivial that at least part of
the differences in mathematics are the biological effects of sex
itself. Given his method, Geary's thesis is guaranteed, whatever
the evidence has shown, or may show—it is a mere tautology and
says nothing about the empirical world.
What drives the debate Geary so masterfully epitomizes is not
science, but ethics. Sure, we want to understand ourselves, and
that is laudable. But when science informs ethics, it ought to
proceed with extra caution. The ethical problem is this: Those
who solve verbal mathematics problems are the leaders, while
those who merely do the arithmetic are the followers. As Geary
notes, "boys are not biologically primed to outperform girls in
basic mathematics [i.e., arithmetic]" (sect. 4.1, para. 4). Many
studies have shown that females are just as good as or better than
males when it comes to arithmetical calculation. In the days
before cheap computing machinery, the scientists of the Manhat-
tan Project use ranks of females to tot up the figures for them,
freeing them to apply mathematics to nature in making the
bomb. The manager must know how much to invest at x%
compound interest to yield $y in z years, while those who only do
the arithmetic given them are the secretaries, tellers, and sales-
persons. And what holds for company leadership must surely
hold for household leadership as well. He who does mathematics
is born to lead, while she who merely does the arithmetic is born
to crochet lace.
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Abstract: We challenge the notion that differences in spatial ability are the
best or only explanation for observed sex differences in mathematical word
problems. We suggest two ideas from the study of autism: sex differences
in theory of mind and in central coherence.
"Amy has two candies. She has one candy less than Mary. How
many candies does Mary have?"
Geary suggests that the male superiority with such word puzzles
is due to greater spatial skill. Teaching a spatial strategy improves
performance, but male superiority remains. Thus, spatial skill is
unlikely to be the source of the sex difference. We would like to
illustrate some alternative explanations through the example of
autism.
Autism is a particularly pertinent case, since in this disorder the
pattern of peaks and troughs is better explained by hypotheses
concerning theory of mind and central coherence than by general
notions of spatial skill and verbal impairment (Frith 1989). The
consistently found performance peak in Block Design was tradi-
tionally thought to indicate intact or superior general visuospatial
ability. An alternative explanation is that a cognitive style of weak
"central coherence" allows individuals with autism to see the
presented design in terms of its parts, which map onto the
individual blocks used to reconstruct the design (Frith & Happ6
1994). Shah & Frith (1993) showed that when the designs were
presegmented, performance in normal and learning disabled but
not autistic individuals improved significantly. In contrast, manip-
ulation of spatial factors (rotation and obliques) did not differen-
tially affect the groups.
Thus a modification that eradicates group differences can
identify the source of that difference at the cognitive level. By this
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logic, spatial ability cannot account for the sex difference in word
problems.
As Geary points out, these problems are oddly phrased. In
many respects the questions, as communications, violate Gricean
maxims. In terms of relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986),
the listener is justified in assuming that the speaker intends the
most accessible interpretation. Anything else is trickery. The
prediction would be that you can improve performance by mak-
ing the correct interpretation relevant (e.g., by highlighting
Mary).
Why should females be more sensitive to this pragmatic viola-
tion? Listeners will only be misled by these puzzles if they are
trying to "read the speakers mind." It is the normal concern with
underlying meaning, versus surface form, that misleads. The same
problem is seen in young children's failure to judge an inadequate
message as ambiguous - especially when the speakers intention is
clear (Beal & Flavell 1984). Recognising the speakers intention
depends upon theory of mind - the ability to attribute indepen-
dent mental states to self and others (Premack & Woodruff 1978).
Greater sensitivity to mental states would therefore be a disadvan-
tage in these word puzzles. Perhaps females have better devel-
oped theory-of-mind skills.
Some tentative evidence emerged in data from 70 normal 3- to
5-year-olds; even after age and verbal ability were partialled out,
gender was a significant predictor of theory-of-mind performance
(Happe 1995). To suggest that theory-of-mind skills may be better
in females is not the same as Gearys argument concerning
cooperative versus competitive social style. Theory of mind is
necessary for both types of social interaction; reading minds allows
deception and empathy, Machiavellian plotting, and insightful
pedagogy. Male competition through resource gathering may take
second place to this special human adaptation; if you can lie, cheat,
and bluff, you don't need to have resources to get a mate. Females,
as the higher-investing, more discriminating sex may have evolved
better theory-of-mind skills.
Since children with autism typically fail test of theory of mind
(Frith 1989), we would predict that they would be less misled
(than verbal-ability-matched controls) by mathematical word
problems. There is another reason, too, why children with autism
might be relatively good at these puzzles. As mentioned above,
children with autism show weak central coherence, attending to
parts over wholes and paying preferential attention to surface form
versus gist. This cognitive style may be characterised in terms of
greater bottom-up processing and less top-down influence. One
way to fail the word puzzles is to leap to conclusions. In this case,
incorrect answers will be given faster than correct ones, even
though the arithmetical operations themselves are of equal diffi-
culty. If top-down strategies cause failure, then inducing a bottom-
up strategy should aid performance. This suggestion predicts
that—in contrast to the other hypotheses—making the content of
the word puzzles more artificial and unfamiliar would help. It is
interesting to note that sex differences on Block Design and
Embedded Figures (Voyer et al., 1995) suggest that females may
have stronger central coherence than males.
These modifications would only be informative if they removed
the sex difference: just improving performance in boys and girls is
not enough. Work on autism reminds us of this lesson, and may
also suggest some interesting avenues for future research on sex
differences. After all, autism, a disorder with a high male:female
ratio, has been described as "an extreme form of maleness"
(Asperger 1944).
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Abstract: In Darwinian terminology, "sexual selection" refers to purely
reproductive competition and is conceptually distinct from natural selec-
tion as it affects reproduction generally. As natural selection may favor the
evolution of sexual dimorphism by virtue of the division of labor between
males and females, this possibility needs to be taken very seriously.
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